In the midst of my readings on Kierkegaard this semester, I came across a text the other day that was quite amusing.
"From what I know about the political situation, it would be easy for Denmark to borrow fifteen million rix-dollars. Why does no one think of this? Now and then we hear that someone is a genius and does not pay his debts, why should a nation not do the same, provided there is agreement? Borrow fifteen million; use it not to pay off our debts but for public entertainment. Let us celebrate the millennium with fun and games. Just as there currently are boxes everywhere for contributions of money, there should be bowl everywhere filled with money. Everything would be free: the theater would be free, prostitutes would be free, rides to Deer Park would be free, funerals would be free, one's funeral eulogy would be free. I say "free" for if money is always available, everything is free in a way. No one would be allowed to own any property. An exception should be made only for me. I shall set aside for myself one hundred rix-dollars a day deposited in a London bank, partly because I cannot manage on less, partly because I am the one who provided the idea, and finally because no one knows if I will not be able to think up a new idea when the fifteen million is exhausted.
SK
Either/Or, A Fragment of Life
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
Pain's Intrinsic Value
Is pain intrinsically evil? In his book Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe Erik Wielenberg (pronounced wheel-en-burg) argues that, in a naturalistic universe without God, there can still be moral obligations to humans. In part of his book, he argues against a popular theological position that holds to the belief that, all true ethical claims are true in virtue of some act of will on the part of God. He does so based on a number of reasons. One of which is that this thesis implies that it is impossible for anything distinct from God to be intrinsically good or evil. He then argues against this upon the fact that some things are intrinsically evil, such as pain (Wielenberg 49-50). This raised a question in my mind, what is the intrinsic nature of pain?
Typically, the response to this is of course that pain is intrinsically evil. To examine this, we need to look at a couple of things. First, what intrinsic nature is. Second, the nature of pain.
As described earlier in his book, Wielenberg defines intrinsic nature as the nature of something in virtue of its own nature, in and of itself. He holds to the Moorean view (Wielenberg 23).
So then, pain, in and of itself, seems to be intrinsically evil, right? I'm not so sure.
Wielenberg's argument would look something like this.
He would first use the Dependency thesis:
1. If all true ethical claims are made true by an act of will by God, then nothing would have intrinsic value.
2. There are some things that have intrinsic value (such as pain).
3. Therefore, not all ethical claims are made true by an act of will by God.
I refute Wielenberg's claim on 2 premises: Either (1) Nothing has intrinsic value, or (2) an act of will by God can bestow value upon something without affecting its intrinsic nature.
I hold to the Augustinian view of evil, namely, that evil is nothing in and of itself, but that it is only a privation of good. Since this is the case, I don't think that pain is intrinsically evil. We seem to always associate pain with something bad or something we don't want. Pain however, does not have a value one way or the other, because it is a privation.
Typically, the response to this is of course that pain is intrinsically evil. To examine this, we need to look at a couple of things. First, what intrinsic nature is. Second, the nature of pain.
As described earlier in his book, Wielenberg defines intrinsic nature as the nature of something in virtue of its own nature, in and of itself. He holds to the Moorean view (Wielenberg 23).
So then, pain, in and of itself, seems to be intrinsically evil, right? I'm not so sure.
Wielenberg's argument would look something like this.
He would first use the Dependency thesis:
1. If all true ethical claims are made true by an act of will by God, then nothing would have intrinsic value.
2. There are some things that have intrinsic value (such as pain).
3. Therefore, not all ethical claims are made true by an act of will by God.
I refute Wielenberg's claim on 2 premises: Either (1) Nothing has intrinsic value, or (2) an act of will by God can bestow value upon something without affecting its intrinsic nature.
I hold to the Augustinian view of evil, namely, that evil is nothing in and of itself, but that it is only a privation of good. Since this is the case, I don't think that pain is intrinsically evil. We seem to always associate pain with something bad or something we don't want. Pain however, does not have a value one way or the other, because it is a privation.
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